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Abstract 
The access to technological resources and capabilities by a 
company may involve the establishment and development of 
business relationships with specific suppliers. These 
relationships may reflect both general, prescribed or formal 
purchasing orientations (i.e. adversarial vs cooperative 
approaches) and more specific evaluation criteria of suppliers. 
This paper aims to analyse the relevance of inconsistencies 
between the two levels for the emergence and search for 
solutions to failures in the accomplishment of functional 
specifications in the stage of series production, i.e. when both 
parties are interdependent. The starting point for the empirical 
study was non-accomplishments of functional specifications 
involving an auto manufacturer and some of its suppliers, 
followed by an exposition of the searching processes for 
solutions, often by trial and error, involving several departments 
and firms. The results of the study suggests that these processes 
may reflect the tensions between transactional and cooperative 
orientations regarding business relationships with suppliers, a 
fragmented view of NPD and series production activities and 
targets, and the lack of integration of the criteria used for the 
evaluation of suppliers within the customer company. In face of 
inconsistencies between the formal purchasing orientation and 
the specific frameworks used to evaluate suppliers during series 
production, local solutions may emerge at operational level, 
which may be contrasted with existing formal orientations. 
Key words: Business Relationships, Supplier Evaluation, 
Functional Specifications.  




An increasing part of the technological resources used by a company is mobilised through 
external sources. In many industries, more than a half of the total costs of the final products 
result from purchased parts and services (Ford et al, 2011; Gadde et al, 2010; Van Weele, 
2005).  
Traditionally, companies have avoided losing valuable intellectual property to competitors. 
Assemblers used to produce most of the components for their products “in-house", in order to 
retain control over their value chains. However, globalisation and rapid technology changes 
impelled “original equipment manufacturers” (OEM) to recognise the importance of inter-
company relationships, in order to access new resources (Handfield et al., 1999). Nowadays, 
the complexity of technology products, such as cars has increased to such an extent that no 
single company possesses ‘in house’ all the resources needed to develop and produce each 
and every part (Ford et al, 2011). Furthermore, knowledge can be developed and transferred 
between industries because suppliers often bridge different markets. OEMs’ efficiency and 
effectiveness came to depend crucially on the performance of their networks of suppliers. 
Furthermore, their suppliers can contribute to innovation, and thus become sources of 
competitive advantage.  
During  not only the stage of new product development (NPD), but also during series production, 
one activity that is carried out by customer firms is the evaluation of the degree of fulfilment of 
the required specifications. Different configurations regarding supplier evaluation dimensions 
and techniques have been established, together with diverse approaches and philosophies for 
purchasing. In the automotive industry, several practices have become explicit over the 
decades. The western car assemblers, with their main focus on the price of purchased inputs, 
used to maintain an “arms-length” relationships with an extensive portfolio of suppliers. 
However, since the 1980s, when the Japanese car manufacturers challenged the western 
OEMs, based on their comparative shorter lead times, better quality and lower production costs 
(Clark, 1989; Cusumano and Takeshi, 1991; Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Kamath and Liker, 1994), 
there has been a growing interest in developing co-operative inter-firm relationships with specific 
suppliers (Dyer, 2000; Phillips et al., 2012). The emergence of structures of counterpart-specific 
relationships has led to the notion of business networks (Håkasson and Snehota, 1995).  
What a supplier is willing to do for and with its customers depends, to a large extent, on the 
relationship between both firms (Fredrikson and Araujo, 2003). Buyer-supplier relationships may 
reflect both general purchasing orientations (Anderson et al, 2009) and the more specific 
evaluation criteria of suppliers (Fredrikson and Araujo, 2003; Van Weele, 2005). While some 
authors argue for the need to ensure the consistency between these two levels (e.g. Anderson 
et al, 2009), others recognise that a customer cannot present a common approach to its 
interactions with all its suppliers (e.g. Fredrikson and Araujo, 2003). 
In line with this perspective, this study aims to analyse the emergence and the resolution of the 
non-accomplishment of functional specifications, both in the broader context of the business 
relationship between the parties, and also in the more specific framework of the criteria for 
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evaluating suppliers.  The next section reviews the literature regarding business relationships, 
supplier involvement in product development and supplier evaluation. The third section justifies 
the choice of methodology and the methods used to conduct the empirical study. The cases are 
described in the fourth section and in the fifth section we present a concluding analysis. 
Literature Review 
In recent years it has been recommended that firms should outsource ancillary activities and 
concentrate on those core competences that add value to their customers (Quinn, 1999; Quinn 
and Hilmer, 1994). As they should also construct accesses to competences that complement 
their own (Phillips et al., 2012), suppliers became ever more important for the performance of 
their customers. Collaboration with suppliers is crucial for firms that purchase, not only in 
financial terms, but also for accessing technological resources and benefits (Ford et al., 2008). 
In particular, inter-organisational networks of suppliers are determinant for the speed of 
development and for launching new products (Corswat and Tunälf, 2002). In this context, 
suppliers came to carry out ever more activities than those formerly carried out by their customer 
companies. This led both to an increase in customers’ expenses and also to a greater focus and 
concern for supplier selection. When companies work together, a successful partnership 
depends fundamentally on process adaptations and key behavioural aspects, such as trust, 
commitment and conflict resolution (Anderson, Narus and Narayandas, 2009). These aspects 
are discussed in the following section. 
Business Relationships: trust, commitment and conflict resolution mechanisms 
The development of business relationships usually requires mutual orientation and adaptations 
of those companies involved (Håkansson and Senhota, 1995). Adaptations are necessary to 
facilitate the coordination of activities, the combination of resources and to create a common 
view of important targets. These adaptations may concern technical issues (changing 
production processes or modifying products), or administrative and logistical company rules and 
routines (Hallén et al., 1991; Håkansson and Senhota, 1995). Walter (2003, p. 724), in a study 
about supplier involvement, defined adaptations as being “the investment of a customer in the 
supplier’s knowledge, structures, and processes, in order to make use of its resources”. Thus, 
by definition, adaptations imply dedicated or counterpart-specific investments by one or both 
companies involved (Hallén et al., 1991).  
The resulting interdependency gives access, over a period of time, to resources and skills that 
a company could not develop alone (Ford et al, 2011). However, dedicated investments create 
interdependencies between the companies, exposing them to the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour by the other party. For example, a supplier may fear being forced to lower the price if 
it became dependent on a customer. Likewise, a dependent customer may be worried about 
the supplier becoming negligent in terms of quality and other factors.  
In this context, trust, commitment and conflict resolution mechanisms are essential to establish, 
develop and maintain a business relationship (Mohr and Speckman, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 
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1994). Trust in a business relationship can be defined as being the firm’s belief that actions by 
the other company will result in positive outcomes for the firm (Anderson et al, 2009). If 
companies do not trust each other, then they will hesitate to share knowledge and information 
and will decline any form of influence or control from the other party, which can disturb joint 
goal-settings and problem solving (Zand, 1972). 
Through commitments, companies promote investments between themselves that are 
dedicated to assets which develop stable relationships (Dyer, 2000). Commitments involve the 
willingness to make short-term sacrifices and actions, in order to sustain a relationship 
(Anderson et al, 2009). This can be achieved by guaranteeing a supply contract for the lifetime 
of a model (Dyer, 2000). In this context, a supplier is much more likely to make dedicated 
investments or adaptations and to share valuable knowledge with the customer (Dyer, 2000). 
Relationships with high degrees of commitment are more likely to succeed, without companies 
running the risk of opportunism from either side (Mohr and Speckman, 1994).  
Some sort of conflict is likely to arise, sooner or later, in every business relationship. Conflicts 
may arise from misunderstood communications, divergent or incompatible goals in the 
organisational structure or between the companies, insufficient definitions of domain, and 
differences in perception of specifications (Rosenberg and Stern, 1970). The absence of conflict 
in a relationship may encourage companies to become passive and non-innovative (Stern and 
EL-Ansary, 1992). Conversely, conflicts may involve mutual behaviours which are capable of 
greatly disturbing relationships.  
Pathological conflicts may harm or even destroy a relationship (Anderson et al, 2009; Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994). Functional conflicts, in turn, are productive discussions held to settle tensions, 
and they result in policy or procedure changes that add value to the relationship (Anderson et 
al, 2009). Morgan and Hunt (1994) claim that the ability to make conflicts functional is a result 
of trust between the companies. Anticipation of conflicts can be achieved by both sides exploring 
inputs from each other on how modifications can be made to adapt processes or technology to 
common interests (Håkansson and Senhota, 1995), by joint goal setting and information 
sharing1. This leads to mutual expectations and specification of cooperative efforts (Mohr and 
Speckmann, 1994). Stern and El-Ansaryn (1992) suggested bilateral exchange programmes of 
employees, so that they be able to represent the viewpoints of partners of major projects that 
have a high potential for conflict, to be an effective way of preventing problems. Anderson et al 
(2009) advocated the introduction of boundary-spanning personnel, i.e. employees who are in 
close contact with partner companies and who are sensitive to problem detection. These 
individuals are expected to informally pre-empt or solve problems before conflicts arise. 
Supplier involvement in product and process development  
A firm’s strategy in managing supplier relationships is contingent on the supplier’s level of 
integration in the product and process development, which, in turn, is related to the specification-
                                                 
1 Information sharing, in the sense of communication of critical and often proprietary information between 
the companies involved (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
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generating process. The degree of supplier involvement in product development reflects the 
division of work between the supplier and the customer in the product creation process. Kamath 
and Liker (1994) have categorised suppliers into four groups: Partner, Mature, Child and 
Contractual. A partner supplier has autonomous engineering and development capacities and 
the relationship is defined as “between equals”. During the product development process, a 
partner collaborates with the OEM from the pre-concept stage onward, and is responsible for 
entire subsystems. A mature supplier is defined as “customer has superior position”, whereby 
the supplier only needs basic specifications from the OEM to develop a product, e.g. interfaces 
with adjacent parts and aesthetic requirements. A child supplier is defined as "customer calls 
the shots”, needs complete specifications, e.g. dimensions, functional and technical 
requirements and materials to be used, in order to produce the component exactly as the 
customer stipulates. Lastly, contractual suppliers are defined as “an extension of a customer’s 
manufacturing capabilities” and provide off-the-shelf parts, which an OEM purchases through 
catalogues. 
In studies of the automobile industry, Clark (1989) concluded from empirical evidence that the 
supplier’s role in product development can be divided into three groups of components. In Black-
Box Parts, the OEM specifies the general product requirements, such as performance, cost 
targets, lead time, etc., and the supplier then carries out the development. In Detail Controlled 
Parts, components are developed entirely by the OEM, while the supplier is responsible for the 
production processes. In the Supplier Proprietary Parts, the supplier produces standard parts 
(off-the-shelf parts) completely on their own. 
As mentioned, in the case of Black Box Parts, the OEM takes advantage of the supplier’s 
development capacity. This implies close relationships with the supplier as well as an intensive 
involvement which results in more efficient product development (Clark, 1989). However, as the 
product development in certain cases is an interactive process between the OEM and the 
supplier, Lamming (1993) argued that there should be a distinction between Black Box Parts 
and Grey Box Parts, the latter involving more OEM influence in the supplier development 
process.  
Some researchers have linked the specification generation process to supplier performance. 
Karlson et al. (1998) noted that disregard of specifications affects the party’s assessment of 
product development, in terms of quality, costs and lead time. Incomplete specifications can 
cause delays in product design and an increase in costs. Furthermore, over-specification can 
hinder the supplier’s ability to produce the component within the current budget and 
technologies (Karlson et al., 1998).  However, as noted by Quinn (1999, p. 18), "If the buyer 
specifies how to do the job in detail, it will kill innovation and vitiate the supplier's real 
advantage".  Araujo et al. (1999) argue that the resources of buyer and supplier and the way 
that they are developed and brought together, determine the static and dynamic efficiency of a 
company. More generally, the use and value of a particular resource results from the 
combination and interaction with other resources in a business relationship (Mouzas and Ford, 
2012). 
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All this suggests that the specification process can be seen as a mechanism for combining the 
resources and capabilities of the firms involved in business exchanges. Araujo et al, (1999) 
presented four types of resource interfaces, based on how a customer can access its suppliers’ 
resources. In the case of standardised interfaces, “… the supplier does not need to know about 
the user context, nor do they need to understand the producer context“, and the products 
exchanged are standardised (Araujo et al, p. 499).  If the customer firm prefers a customised 
product, then the supplier needs to receive certain instructions from the customer. In a specified 
interface, the supplier requires detailed specifications about the characteristics of the product 
and/or how it is to be manufactured. In a translation interfaces, the supplier translates the 
functional description given by the customer into a product. Thus, the buyer allows the supplier 
to take important decisions on how to best meet the user requisites. Finally, in an interactive 
interface, both the buyer and supplier develop the specifications together, based on their 
knowledge of user and producer contexts. This is a joint learning process that may result in 
adaptations from the parties involved (Araujo et al, 1999; Gadde et al, 2010). Thus, in a strong 
sense, what a supplier can do for (or with) a customer depends on how both parties combine 
their resources and capabilities.  
Supplier evaluation criteria and purchasing orientations 
Several techniques have been established over time to evaluate the performance of suppliers 
(Fredriksson and Araujo, 2003). These techniques reflect the customer’s expectations of the 
supplier, and whether emphasis is given to short-term performance, or long-term relationships 
(Fredriksson and Araujo, 2003). In the traditional purchasing model, the customer evaluates 
tenders from competing suppliers, in order to purchase the cheapest product, based on the 
buyer’s specification (Gadde et al, 2010). In relational models, the target of business customers 
is not to purchase the cheapest pre-specified product, but to look for solutions by using 
resources from specific suppliers (Ford et al, 2011).  
Anderson et al (2009) argued that the scope of evaluation criteria is associated with different 
types of purchasing orientations. The buying orientation, or the traditional model of purchasing 
(Gadde et al, 2010), is a purchasing activity that focusses on transactional and short term 
relationships with suppliers (Anderson et al, 2009). Every purchasing decision is an isolated 
event (Gadde et al, 2010), in which usually a different functional department of a customer 
company issues a purchasing release to the purchasing department. Quality and availability are 
basic conditions that the customer has to recognise in the supplier, and, as such, price tends to 
be the main criterion for selecting a supplier (Anderson et al, 2009; Gadde et al, 2010). Through 
multi-sourcing and global sourcing, the customer maximises their power over suppliers and 
lowers prices, as it is able to obtain quotes for tenders from large numbers of suppliers around 
the world (Anderson et al, 2009). Even if a supplier wins the business with its offer, frequently 
the bidding does not stop. Deflective behaviour and information-withholding occur from both 
sides as a means of gaining business or lower prices (Lamming, 1993). In the buying orientation, 
the customer sets the target, and the supplier will hardly ever provide benefits through best 
performance, as the emphasis is on price (Lamming, 1993; Nellore et al., 2001). The products 
delivered seek just to fulfil the customers’ specifications (Gadde et al, 2010).  
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In contrast to the buying (or transactional) orientation, both the procurement and the supply 
management orientations are relational, in the sense that they require collaborative 
relationships with suppliers (Anderson et al., 2009). Quality and logistic issues may require 
integrating other departments of production and logistics in the purchasing process (Axelsson 
et al., 2005). The purchasing department may also work closely with engineers so that the 
suppliers of critical parts can be involved in the early stages of product design and development. 
The customer firm may act deliberately to develop its suppliers’ capabilities (Axelsson et al., 
2005). In these types of orientations, the combination of internal with external resources and 
capabilities occurs in the context of long-term relationships. It requires other functional groups 
within the company to be integrated in the purchasing decision and the suppliers’ evaluation 
(Anderson et al., 2009; Axelsson et al., 2005; Gadde et al, 2010). As noted by Teece et al. 
(1997), purchasing decisions need to consider the value of the resources that are integrated 
and reconfigured by other functional departments, as these resources define the dynamic 
capabilities of the organisation. 
Different purchasing orientations may co-exist within a particular industry and may change in 
the same firm over time. For example, in a study about the American auto industry, Dyer (2000, 
p. 111) pointed out that “In the spring of 1992, General Motors’ purchasing czar, Jose Ignacio 
Lopes, instructed his troops that cozy supplier relationships were a thing of the past. Every 
supplier would have to re-win its business in a new round of bidding.” In the opinion of General 
Motors’ executives, partnerships with suppliers were obstructive (Dyer, 2000). In the same 
study, Dyer (2000) contrasted General Motors with the example of Chrysler’s Extended 
Enterprise. During the 80’s and 90’s the American auto OEMs were far behind their Japanese 
competitors in terms of delivery, costs and product quality (Dyer, 2000). Many companies tried 
to imitate the Japanese supply management system by cutting costs through reduction of 
supplier bases, bestowing suppliers with quality responsibility, and implementing just in time 
(JIT) delivery. As Dyer (2000) contended, these measures merely helped these companies to 
survive.  
According to Dyer, in order to become truly competitive, adversarial relationships with suppliers 
would have to give way to partnerships. Initially, Chrysler’s engineers developed components 
and then its buyers selected a supplier capable of producing it at the lowest price (Dyer, 2000). 
After the change, the automaker eliminated competitive bidding in order to create a mutual vision 
of how to create value. Cross-functional teams of engineering, quality and purchasing 
professionals were by then choosing the most appropriate suppliers, and giving them significant 
or total responsibility for developing prototypes and series production, which resulted in a 
common view of design, quality and cost (Dyer, 2000). In addition, suppliers were asked to 
assist the OEM in matters relating to improvements in weight, warranty and complexity. The 
former president of Chrysler, Robert Lutz, explained the new programme to his largest suppliers 
in the following words: “All I want is your brainpower, not your margins” (Dyer, 2000, p. 124). By 
doing so, Chrysler managed to become the company with the highest profit per car in the world 
(Liker, 2004), but only until Daimler took it over in 1998 (Liker and Choi, 2004). 
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Therefore, several techniques and emphases have been adopted over time to evaluate the 
performance of suppliers, which all seem to be associated with different purchasing orientations 
of customer firms. Nevertheless, each functional department in a company may have its own 
evaluation criteria, since their interests and expectations regarding the counterpart can differ. 
Consequently, a customer cannot present a strictly common approach in its interaction with 
suppliers. Fredriksson and Araujo (2003) pointed out that instead of placing too much emphasis 
on one single dimension, i.e. cost, delivery and quality, the use of multi-criteria models in 
supplier evaluation provides advantages through the complementing and overlapping of 
perspectives. 
Research purpose 
The development of business relationships usually requires mutual orientation and adaptations 
of the companies involved. In the context of a structure of counterpart-specific investments, 
trust, commitment and conflict resolution mechanisms are essential to maintain a working 
relationship. These relationships may reflect general, prescribed, or formal purchasing 
orientations (i.e. adversarial vs cooperative approaches), and more specific evaluation criteria 
of suppliers. In line with this perspective, the paper aims to analyse the relevance of the 
inconsistency between the two levels for the emergence and search for solutions to failures in 
the accomplishment of functional specifications during the series production stage, i.e. when 
both parties are interdependent.   
By considering the broader context of the business, the relationship between the parties and 
specific frameworks or criteria for evaluating suppliers, it is herein suggested that the non-
accomplishment of functional specifications, and the search for solutions in the stage of series 
production, may be linked to: 
a) The relationship between the firms, namely the customers’  transactional or collaborative 
orientations; 
b) The relevance of the division of work in the specification generating process;  
c) A fragmented evaluation of suppliers by different functional departments. 
Methodology 
Case studies are an adequate research strategy to answer “how” questions about a 
contemporary set of events over which the researcher has little or no control (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002; Yin, 2003; Easton, 2010). This kind of question is also associated with process analysis, 
which is defined as being a sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities 
unfolding over time in context (Pettigrew, 1997:338). This takes into account that business 
relationships are not steady states, but rather dynamic states with indirect and often delayed 
effects, which require research over a period time (Dubois and Araujo, 2004; Pettigrew, 1997). 
Besides, according to Van der Valk (2008), ongoing interactions that take place both within 
organisations and across organisational borders need researching in real life situations. 
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Since our objective focusses on questions of “how”, in a contemporary context, which involve 
interactions both within an organisation and across its borders, our case study research strategy 
seems adequate here. The research site chosen was the Quality Assurance Buy-Parts 
Department (QA) of a car assembly plant, during August 2012 through to June 2013. This site 
is particularly interesting, as the diverse capabilities and resources of both the supplier’s and 
customer’s functional departments are combined, through an intra and inter-organisational 
network, in order to resolve together, on the shop floor, any non-conformance that results from 
earlier activities. 
The case study focal actor is one single organisation, and the larger unit of analysis includes 
two sub units of analysis, which results in an embedded case study design (Yin, 2003). Each 
sub unit involves the car assembly plant and its suppliers in different technological fields, and in 
current activity stages. Both stages address new product development and the ongoing process 
of buy-parts supply. The idea that was underlying this design was not to compare the sub units, 
but rather to observe the variations among them, and also the individual contributions or 
relevance to the larger unit (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). As Langley et al. (2013, p. 9) noted, 
“…ongoing interactions among different individuals, between individuals and organizations, and 
between multiple levels across organizations and contexts permeate and orient change 
processes”.  
In our study, evidence was systematically collected through multiple sources, to triangulate lines 
of research (Yin, 2003). The evidence collected included company records, statistics, meeting 
minutes and internal company guidelines from the OEM, as well as direct observations, 
participant observation, and informal conversation with quality engineers of the OEM and 
representatives of the suppliers. 
Direct observations were conducted in four meetings, at management level and between the 
OEM and the suppliers used in the study. Every meeting lasted, on average, three hours. In 
addition, the researcher attended weekly video conferences between the Purchasing, Quality, 
Logistics, Development and Production departments of the OEM, regarding the management of 
changes of the current models and delivery dates of first samples of pre-line models. Participant 
observations were possible, as one of the researchers performed diverse functions relating to 
quality concerns and the preparation of line processes of buy-parts, and also direct interaction 
with suppliers. Every week, for nine months, the researcher assumed the position of a neutral 
organiser of round table meetings between the OEM and several suppliers. These round table 
meetings were aimed to solve quality concerns and to follow up on new projects of buy-parts. 
The case studies 
This section starts with a cursory presentation of the OEM, the formal procedures that regulate 
new product development processes, especially the generation of specifications, the selection 
of suppliers, the description of their roles, the procedures for quality control and, finally, the 
procedures for implementing changes in the components acquired by the OEM. Next, we 
present a description of the technical problems that happened relative to two specific 
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components, and how the parts sought to find out the immediate and remote causes for these 
problems, in the context of several episodes of interaction between the representatives of the 
various firms involved. 
The OEM: NPD and formal Purchasing processes 
The focal firm is an OEM which operates in the automotive industry. Its formal product 
development process consists of four different stages: the project definition stage, the concept 
and product development stage, the preparation for series production, and series production 







Figure 1: Simplified Product Development Process 
Research and Development 
The Research and Development department of the OEM (R&D) is responsible for the 
development of new parts and the vehicle itself and also detailed construction and try-outs. In 
general, future line suppliers are not part of the concept development phase. Integration usually 
only happens as a consulting function where the supplier (or engineering service provider) is 
compensated directly from the product development budget. 
The R&D consists of five main sub-divisions: Group Research; Design; Technical Project 
Management; Group Development Management; Aggregate: Electric/ Electronic, Body/ Interior, 
Chassis, Complete Vehicle/ Assembly, Concept and Commercial Vehicle Development.  
After the technical and feasibility approval of a component, R&D generates the “purchasing 
release” (PR) (Fig. 1). With the PR, the Purchasing Department, which is centralised in the 
OEM’s head office, receives the order to start sourcing relevant suppliers. The work of 
Simultaneous Engineering Teams (SET) seeks to reduce the product development time2. SETs 
are composed of employees from the divisions involved in the product development process 
(e.g. including Production, Logistics, Purchasing and Quality Assurance). SET members 
                                                 
2 SET – Simultaneous Engineering Teams, as opposed to the traditional sequential approach to product 
development activities. 
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represent the project needs of their divisions, and ensure that their divisions’ specific 
requirements be incorporated in the project development.  
SETs do not include representatives from suppliers. However, the suppliers of more complex 
components, such as heating or seat systems, are in close contact, on an informal basis, with 
the responsible engineer for the respective part, and also from the Quality Assurance (QA) and 
R&D departments of the OEM. 
The setting of specifications  
General Management, together with the R&D and Production departments, generate the 
Product Requirement Letter (PRL) with product and market targets. The PRL, along with the 
Product Concept (Market Segment and Project Timings), give the input for the Technical 
Concept Description (TCD) which is generated by the R&D department. The TCD is the main 
specification in the early stage of the product development process, and it includes rough 
estimations of Target Markets and is used to evaluate the concepts.  
The Technical Project Management of the R&D generates the Technical Product Description 
(TPD). The TPD is a complete and structured description of the technical requests and 
specifications for the NPD in the early stage of the Product Development Process. Based on 
the TPD, the R&D sub-divisions evaluate the financial and time expenses, which occur during 
the development process. The TPD also provides the Finance, Purchasing, Production, 
Marketing and QA departments with an overview and evaluation of the project.  
For every component, the sub-divisions of R&D generate detailed specifications. These 
specifications are partly-delineated technical descriptions at sub system and component levels, 
and drawings and project-specific functional dimension catalogues. Suppliers only influence the 
specification-generating process if they are contracted as engineering service providers. All 
specifications are binding for the supplier. Suppliers sometimes claim that the OEM should be 
more open to suppliers’ suggestions (observations by a participant). 
The sourcing process 
When choosing between different suppliers, the OEM separates the sourcing process into two 
phases: the development phase, where new components for new projects are first developed 
and then sourced out (forward sourcing), and the line phase (global sourcing) (see Fig. 2). Each 
decision is made by the Central Sourcing Committee (CSC), through nomination of the most 
adequate supplier sourced by the purchasing department. Despite the standardised product 
development process (PDP) which indicates that the sourcing process starts with the PR, 
depending on the complexity of the components, i.e. time to completion for line tooling, the 
purchasing department starts sourcing the suppliers at the same time as the development of 
the respective component. 
 
 










Figure 2: The OEM’s sourcing process 
Forward sourcing process - potential suppliers are identified using the information provided to 
the OEM in a B2B platform. After a pre-selection, the supplier receives a request for quotation 
based on the technical, financial, organisational and quality requirements of the OEM. The 
supplier then provides a quotation to the OEM and the Purchasing department ensures that this 
quotation does not neglect any important, possibly price relevant, aspect of the component. 
During this phase, suppliers are also asked to meet the R&D representatives, and to present 
their engineering capabilities and available technologies, preferably adding up reference sample 
parts. 
To be admitted as a potential supplier, a firm has to fulfil the standards of the OEM (e.g. 
regarding quality, process and production). Then the Purchasing department initiates the 
bidding process, usually oriented at the A-price3 . Thereafter, a selection of the most attractive 
suppliers is presented to the Central Sourcing Committee, which nominates the supplier, based 
on strategic considerations and the competitiveness of its quotations. After the nomination, the 
supplier starts manufacturing the line tooling. The supplier produces their Production budget, 
and is reimbursed by the Purchasing department, provided that the parts are assessed with 
grade 1 by the QA4. The Purchasing department constantly monitors the project performance 
of the new components, i.e. Supplier Readiness Management, in order to guarantee the supply 
of samples for specific project milestones. 
Global sourcing process - The aim of the global sourcing process is to optimise the resources 
of build-to-print parts. At certain time intervals along the line process, the supplier base is 
reviewed, in terms of cost and performance5. The OEM seeks price optimisation by 
                                                 
3 A-price is the price of the product, excluding transport costs. 
4 Quality engineers evaluate part-samples and give the following grades: 1 (“total acceptance”), 3 
(“conditional acceptance”), and 6 (“failed”). 
5 Jose Ignacio Lopez has been credited with this approach. 
 
Figure 3: Audit Defect Categories 
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benchmarking, procurement of advantage of price potential, creation of competition, money 
exchange rates and tracking of new sub-suppliers. As quoted by a member of the CSC: “With 
the nomination of a supplier, the sourcing process does not stop. It is a continuous process of 
price optimisation and quality improvement, all at the same time.” 
Quality Assurance of Buy-Parts 
Quality Assurance (QA) is divided into four groups: interior; exterior; chassis, and; electrical 
parts. Once a supplier is nominated, the QA of the OEM collaborates with the supplier in order 
to build up a mature series production process. The supplier sends initial samples from the 
series tooling to the Head of Quality for assessment. Parts have to pass three phases of 
evaluation (dimensional, material and functional/ assembly) with grade 1. The Production Trial 
Series (PTS, 6 months before Start of Production, aka SOP, see Fig. 1), and Zero Series (aka 
0S, 3 months before SOP) are both built using the required series production facilities, under 
series production conditions. This way, the OEM is able to perform all the tests with the cars at 
line standards. The supplier, in turn, has to provide line capacity 6 months before the start of 
series production. 
A final assessment of the product and the process may include a two-day production experiment 
in front of a representative from the QA at the supplier’s facilities, in order to assess its capability 
for production under line conditions. After SOP, the QA carries out quality measures during line 
manufacturing. Several cars are chosen every day for product-audits and defects are then 





The auditors also differentiate whether the defects appeared during final assembly, stamping, 
or body production or whether they are due to failure of buy parts. If the defect is supplier-
related, depending on the category of the defect, QA then takes action vis-à-vis the supplier. 
Some suppliers have resident engineers at the OEM plant for joint problem solving and faster 
reaction times. The QA keeps a database with the audit points of defected components that 
have been delivered by each supplier has, for the supplier performance assessment. 
Engineering Changes 
Once a component has been defined and released by R&D, it only can be modified through 
what is called an Engineering Change (EC). Modifications may concern the product itself 
(design, function, material, etc.) or the process (manufacturing, logistics, etc.). ECs can be 
requested either by the departments of the OEM (e.g. R&D, QA, and Production), or by the 
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supplier. After an EC is requested (ECR), its feasibility has to be judged by the R&D and 
Production departments of the OEM. After feasibility approval, the ECR is sent to the Purchasing 
department. The Purchasing department then evaluates the ECR, together with all the divisions 
that are affected by the change (e.g. Finance, QA, Logistics, etc.). The final approval is decided 
later by the Product Management for that vehicle project, based on the overall impact of the EC 
on the vehicle (quality, cost, etc.).  
After final approval, R&D adapts the drawings and specifications to the demands of the EC and 
then provides the new PR (purchasing release). With the new PR, the Purchasing department 
requests that the supplier implement the change in their production. After the implementation is 
completed, the supplier is required to send initial samples of the “new” part to the respective 
quality engineer for assessment. Once accepted by the quality engineer, the supplier starts the 
series production of the changed part (see Fig. 4). The whole process takes about 3 months 
(but can take up to one whole year). 
Source: adapted from internal company guidelines 
Figure 4: Engineering Change Process & involved parties 
Sub Unit of Analysis 1: Decorative Films 
The ‘SP-Model 2’ is a special version of the current OEM Model, which is fabricated at OEM 
Inc., a European production unit of the OEM. The idea was to build an image of a loud sports 
car i.e. “the evil of OEM”, and to stimulate the life cycle of the OEM A-segment, a mixture of a 
sporty hatchback and a coupé. The car should continue the characteristics of the OEM ‘SP-
Model 1’ from the early 1980s, through the placement of decorative films and nostalgic features, 
such as the ball gear stick, among others. The focus of this case is on the decorative films, 
which are relatively simple in terms of product and process technologies, yet have to meet high 
quality standards and aesthetic demands.  
In December of 2011, R&D gave the purchasing release for the decorative films, and the CSC 
(Central Sourcing Committee) nominated Supplier 1 and Sub-supplier 1 to supply the decorative 
films of the SP-Model 2.  Supplier 1, located in Central Europe, possesses advanced 
manufacturing and developing capacities for product design and labelling solutions for both the 
automotive and non-automotive sectors. Supplier 1 supplies scuff-plates for all current models 
of the OEM. In this process, Supplier 1 receives the raw material and then cuts and combines it 
to the desired dimensions and colour combinations, according to the specification from the R&D 
department. Sub-supplier 1 supplies the raw material to Supplier 1, in preparation for series 
production. 
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According to a purchasing representative, the main reason for the nomination of these suppliers 
was the cheaper A-price of the components. One of the Product Managers expressed his 
‘tongue in cheek’ view about the nomination of Supplier 1: “what a pity… I thought that it was 
due to their experience…”. The CEO of a competitor company (Supplier 2) recognised that his 
firm would not be able to compete on price with Supplier 1 for the decorative films.  
In preparation for series production, Supplier 1 and OEM Inc. made several dedicated 
investments, e.g. an ‘application chamber’, a special room with low air circulation, and 
cupboards for the foils, special light and anti-static suits for anyone who entered. Furthermore, 
OEM Inc. carried out several workshops with Supplier 1, to train those involved in the process 
of applying the decorative films. OEM Inc. was the first production unit of the OEM to integrate 
these stripes in their series production. Other production units only provided “after sales” 
solutions. 
During 2012, several problems began to arise with the supply of the decorative films. In April of 
2012, Supplier 1 missed the delivery date for the initial samples, due to bottleneck problems 
with Sub-supplier 1. In June of 2012, some non-conformances were identified, regarding 
dimensions, colours and material. Master samples for colour measuring and material structure, 
signed by R&D (foil glued on body steel) had not been made available. The Production 
Department initiated an ECR (Engineering Change Request) to change the dimensions of the 
foils. Supplier 1 and Quality Assurance agreed that the base material was the most critical issue 
and suggested using other suppliers, e.g. Sub-supplier 2. However, R&D accepted the surface 
characteristics after comparing it with raw material from other suppliers, and the ECR 
dimensions. The Sales and Marketing Department of the OEM Group prepared, together with 
Supplier 1, a “Photo Car” and announced the car as already being available for sale. 
However, in July 2012, the OEM Inc. Quality Manager did not approve the structure of the base 
material when the ‘0-series’ cars were built. The issue escalated to the OEM’s top quality 
management and, a few days later, all production was cancelled. 
Supplier change – Series Production 
In August of 2012, the CSC (Central Sourcing Committee) nominated Supplier 2 and Sub-
supplier 2 to become the line suppliers for the project. Supplier 2 is a small company, 
specialising in cutting and combining decorative films and already supplies decorative films to 
two production units of different brands of the OEM. Sub-supplier 2 is a major company in 
vehicle surface solutions, and is a global player in industries such as healthcare and fire 
protection, amongst others. Through Supplier 1, it supplies two other production units of the 
OEM Group with similar products. 
After SOP (start of production) of the SP-Model 2 in November 2012, some of the stripes sets 
supplied to OEM Inc. were found to be defective. OEM Inc. rejected several of them and returned 
them to Supplier 2 to assess the identified defects. Due to the situation (stripes had already 
been glued to the car bodies and were then ripped off them), Supplier 2 and Sub-supplier 2 
could not analyse the defects before application.  
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In February 2012, a meeting between quality representatives from OEM Inc. and the OEM, 
Supplier 2 and Sub-supplier 2 was held to openly discuss questions relating to the failed analysis 
and the lack of feedback from the supplier. Representatives from R&D and the Purchasing 
department did not attend the meeting. The application specialist of Sub-supplier 2 claimed that 
the damage of the scratched rejected parts was due to incorrect application. Therefore, the 
suppliers suggested carrying out further workshops to train the application personnel, in order 
to guarantee a high level of quality during the application process, as well as a three days stay 
of the suppliers at the OEM Inc. plant to analyse the defects. Moreover, suppliers claimed that 
OEM Inc. should pay them some compensation. OEM Inc. rejected this idea, and claimed that 
they had all the competences they required for application of the film. They also insisted that 
Supplier 2 and Sub-supplier 2 rent external installations to analyse the failures, together with 
representatives from the Quality Department, and to set up a failure/ defects catalogue.  
Sub-supplier 2 indicated that in foil projects, failures or defects could appear at any point along 
the whole process chain, which included production activities at the Sub-supplier 2 and Supplier 
2 units, and logistics and application processes at OEM Inc. The suppliers requested better 
quality control (Quality Gate at OEM Inc.). However, as the zero defect strategy challenges 
suppliers to send only good parts, rather than a ppm (parts per million) target for the supplier, 
this proposal was not accepted by OEM Inc. Sub-supplier 2 also pointed out that the supplied 
quality satisfied the standards of the current projects at the OEM. 
Usually, the OEM scraps rejected parts and fines their suppliers for these rejections, alleging 
the disturbance cause to the manufacturer’s production process. However, in this case, Supplier 
2 was exempted from paying these fines, due to a bilateral agreement with the Quality 
Department. 
In April 2012, there was second meeting with the suppliers, to seek an agreement regarding the 
non-conformance of the line process. The CEO from Supplier 2, as well as the Key Accounts 
Manager and Application Specialist from Sub-Supplier 2, met the quality manager and 
engineers from production and the exterior buy-parts department, as well as representatives 
from logistics from OEM Inc. A breakdown of the scrapped parts showed that 18% of parts had 
been delivered with defects, 55% were due to process failures, and 27% had been FCP (Final 
Check Point) quality audit rejections. In other words, the acceptance criteria of the Application 
Supervisor is different to that of the QA Auditors. 
According to the OEM’s engineers, the main problem in the application had to do with dust in 
the environment. However, the application specialist from Sub-supplier 2 disagreed. He pointed 
out that no problem had arisen in another production unit in the OEM Group which happens to 
be located close to an active volcano, hence with large amounts of dust in the atmosphere. In 
the opinion of this application specialist, some parts had been rejected for defects, such as 
scratches, that would not be visible after application. Moreover, additional training of the 
operators would allow them to have more success in discriminating good parts from parts to be 
rejected. However, the exterior buy-parts engineers did not accept these contentions. 
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Anyway, the sub-supplier 2 had already compiled a training manual for another OEM Inc., and 
it was his intention to standardise the application process across the plants of the OEM Group. 
He also requested permission to analyse several defective parts with a microscope, and to 
elaborate a defect catalogue intended for use by the whole group. 
As the films could not be properly analysed after having been removed from the line, the 
application specialist (Sub-supplier 2) called for a gentlemen’s agreement with the OEM 
regarding the rejection of parts. Cost sharing for the defective parts was agreed with the QA. 
Supplier 2 and Sub-supplier 2 would also meet at the OEM, at certain intervals, to examine the 
scrapped parts, together with the latter’s quality engineers.  
Sub Unit of Analysis 2: Sliding Door Module 
Supplier A is a concept supplier of side-door actuators of the OEM’s Multi-Purpose Vehicle 
(MPV). Located in Central Europe, in 1925 the supplier created the first automobile side-door 
latch, and since then it has developed over 200 lock families, with up to 96 latch variants. 
Supplier A supplies a wide range of automotive manufacturers, up to F-segment cars, and has 
patents of electrical solutions for sliding door modules. 
The MPV was launched in 2010, being the first non-commercial vehicle from the OEM with a 
sliding door, which is available for customers on both sides of the car. In the concept stage, the 
supplier presented two different solutions to R&D, one for the left, and another for the right 
sliding door. In the design of the component, the gravity of the electric motor minimises the play 
between the actuator and the driving screw. This characteristic requires that the electrical motor 
be placed ahead of the actuator. R&D approved both modules. 
However, afterwards, the Purchasing department agreed with R&D to introduce only one type 
of sliding module in the line, in order to reduce the A-price. Due to this decision, the fixing point 
of the motor changed, and now the electric motor of the right sliding door was placed underneath 
the actuator, which resulted in a gap between the actuator and the driving screw. 
Several months after the SOP of the MPV, car owners complained about abnormal noises on 
the right sliding door. Car owners called for rectification under warranty conditions. Supplier A 
was invited to discuss the problems at a round table meeting at the OEM’s premises. The first 
meeting took place in November 2012. Representatives from senior management, QA, and the 
Production departments from both sides discussed the issues. 
The specification for noise level was 60 dB, whereas the complaint was about a noise level that 
was slightly over 50 dB. The component’s technical requirement also indicates that no disturbing 
noises should be heard inside the car. The OEM has special acoustic requirements, a standard 
to which the device to be developed must conform, e.g. window lift, control motor relay, pump 
and valve. This specification mentions several norms to test the noises of the devices. The 
specification states: “Accessory device starting automatically with combustion engine switched 
off must not exceed 55 dB”.  
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL 20, ISSUE 1. 2015. 19-41 
 
36 
The supplier indicated that, during the last visit by the OEM’s representatives to the supplier’s 
installations, they had examined the control plan several times without significant problems. The 
main problem, according to Supplier A, was not the processes, but the concept and additional 
requirements added to the approved concept after the start of series production. In fact, the 
component is in its 38th generation, which means that it has been changed 38 times since being 
accepted for series production. 
To test noises, the supplier uses a whole MPV body to measure the total sound pressure level 
of the motor when it is in use. Supplier A developed, for this purpose, a software to measure the 
total sound pressure, vibration, natural frequency and frequency peaks at end of line testing. As 
the car owners claimed to hear the noises mainly when the car was parked and inclined towards 
the front, the test centre from Supplier A used a hoist to lift the rear end, to simulate this situation. 
Supplier A’s End-of-Line tests revealed no dB difference in the analysed actuators, however, in 
the assembled cars, the right hand side was noisy. During the following week, Supplier A was 
to present improvement and quality control proposals, in order to solve the issue. OEM Inc. and 
R&D from OEM Group then evaluated these proposals with relation to cost, feasibility and 
timings. Thereafter, Supplier A was to perform experiments during a whole production week at 
the OEM, in order to evaluate the noise levels in road tests.  However, the requests from the 
OEM were not satisfied.  
At a second meeting in April 2013, two cars were displayed to the Quality Managers from 
Supplier A. Both parts made several proposals and agreed to implement four technical solutions. 
Supplier A was to present 200 modules, with all the four hypothetical solutions implemented in 
equal numbers. 
The supplier also claimed that the touch area should be changed or isolated, but the OEM 
argued that several tests regarding this issue had previously been carried out, without 
improvement. As 200 modules meant a considerable investment for the supplier, the Quality 
Manager from the OEM recommended that the supplier should request a Deviation Permit6 from 
R&D. 
Supplier A made it clear that they had invested in an ongoing improvement process, without 
having received the whole budget for the project from the OEM. The supplier indicated that the 
parts are spec-wise. As the project was evaluated by the QA of the OEM with Grade 3 
(conditional acceptance), supplier A was only paid 70% of the project budget. The Purchasing 
Department was to fund the rest of the project, once Supplier A had received Grade 1 from QA. 
Consequently, the supplier reduced its support for the project to a minimum. 
Following the meeting, Supplier A was attributed Grade 1, in order to receive the shortfall. The 
modules with the Deviation Permits were to be tested, and the best improvement was to be 
chosen for subsequent implementation through an Engineering Change in the process. Again, 
                                                 
6 A Deviation Permit is requested from the R&D to produce a limited number of components deviating from 
the standard specifications. This measure is used for large scale tests to define improvements which 
afterwards may be implemented through ECs 
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the modified parts would be evaluated, according to the normal first sample assessment 
process. Once the “new” parts received Grade 1, the Purchasing Department would then pay 
the shortfall to the supplier. Based on this decision, the supplier would be able to meet the 
requirements regarding module optimisations. 
Concluding analysis 
This study sought to analyse the emergence and resolution of failures in achieving functional 
specifications, both within the broader context of the business relationship between the parties, 
and also the specific framework constituted by the criteria for assessing suppliers. More 
specifically, we contend that the non-accomplishment of functional specifications, together with 
the search for solutions in the stage of series production, depend on the relationship between 
the firms, the division of work in the specification process, and a possibly fragmented 
assessment from different departments.  
Regarding the first question, i.e. the relationships between firms, the cases made clear that 
there can be a ‘tension’ between a firm’s formal (or procedures) approach to its suppliers, and 
the approach that is actually adopted on the shop floor. It should be remembered that if the 
emphasis is on price as the main criterion for the selection of the suppliers (in the first case), or 
for the selection of technical solutions (in the second case), then this reflects the predominance 
of a short-term orientation with regards to firms’ relationships with their suppliers.  As we saw, 
new suppliers may provide quotations during the series production process.  
However, in the face of specific problems in the preparation for series production, or during 
series production, tensions emerge around non-conformance issues and these force changes 
or deviations from the customer’s formal (adversarial) orientation. In fact, on the shop floor, 
some functional departments of the customer tend to be more collaborative with suppliers when 
it comes to non-accomplishment of functional specifications. In order to improve process and 
product quality, both specific functional departments and the suppliers have to make dedicated 
investments and must gradually adapt to certain company rules and processes. These informal 
adaptations on the shop floor can be interpreted as being a manifestation of reciprocal 
willingness for commitment and trust building (Hallén et al. 1991). In other words, despite the 
formal purchasing orientation, a degree of consistency emerged between a new informal 
orientation (more collaborative) and the criteria used to assess and maintain a working 
relationship between the customer and the supplier.  
Our cases provide further evidence of these changes, if we consider conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Our focal organisation uses a method called ‘round table meetings’ to discuss 
openly and without domination and confrontation, emerging conflicts between the OEM and the 
supplier. When, in meetings, the customer unilaterally demands improvements from the supplier 
without its support, then some stress creeps into the relationship, and trust and commitment 
tend to falter. In contrast, these meetings lead to good results when both parties contribute with 
ideas and knowledge in order to solve non-conformance.  
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Secondly, in face of the problems related with the non-accomplishment of functional 
specifications in the production unit, some of the problems can be traced back to a lack of 
involvement of the suppliers in new product development activities. As stated in the exposition 
of the cases, the specifications are generated exclusively by the OEM Group’s R&D during the 
development phase. The supplier has to fulfil these specifications, otherwise failing will lead to 
losing business, or failing to be paid the budgeted sums that they invested in producing the 
component. As suppliers of Detail Controlled Parts (Clark, 1989), the supplier is responsible for 
development, but it has no influence on the integration of the component in the final system. 
Additionally, when a supplier is given development responsibilities, they are supervised by the 
R&D department and do not necessarily become line suppliers.  It is worth remembering that, 
since the supplier is not present in SET (simultaneous engineering teams), mutual adaptations 
of technical issues are hard to obtain at this stage of the product creation process. These 
adaptations would be essential for the function of the product itself and integration in the whole 
system, in order to prevent the dissatisfaction of future car owners (case 2). As illustrated in our 
cases, engineering changes are financially costly and time-consuming processes, and it is 
suggested that both disadvantages might be contained if the manufacturer sough inputs from 
the supplier at earlier development stages. 
Additionally, the cases also showed that it is possible for mutual adaptations to start, and to 
even continue during the preparation for series production, or even after the start of production. 
In these two cases it is evident that suppliers had been a source of new ideas to the OEM’s 
technicians, which suggests that the knowledge boundaries between the supplier and customer 
became somewhat blurred.  It is therefore natural that, in the face of recurrent problems of a 
similar type, quality engineers often claim that the Purchasing and R&D departments should be 
present at quality meetings that are held to clear out surging non-conformance issues arising 
during series production on the shop floor (case 1).  The QA members see themselves as the 
area that has the closest contact with the supplier, where the competences of all involved parties 
converge.  
Finally, the empirical studies illustrate how important it is to develop an integrated vision of 
internal and external resources and company policies that govern the way that resources and 
competences are combined in product development and series production. A lack of integration 
of a variety of perspectives and experiences with suppliers may generate, on the one hand, 
tensions and conflicts among internal departments and, on the other hand, inconsistencies 
between firms’ purchasing orientations and the specific frameworks used in the daily interactions 
between customer representatives and suppliers.  In one of the cases, the Purchasing 
department had selected a supplier based on its cheaper price, but the Product Manager would 
rather have emphasised this supplier´s experience. Emphasis on a single dimension, i.e. price, 
during the supplier evaluation process, can later lead to increased expenses throughout the 
whole product development process. These expenses become particularly clear during the 
preparation for series production and in production itself.  Two processes, described in these 
cases, support this contention: one, when the OEM changed its foil supplier due to non-
satisfying quality from the QA’s point of view and, the other, the Engineering Changes of the 
sliding door module. 
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Our study reinforces the notion that what a supplier is willing to do for and with the customer 
depends largely on the relationship between the parts (Fredrikson and Araujo, 2003). As 
suggested by several authors, efficiency and innovation can be improved by early supplier 
involvement, combining internal with external resources and trough developing long-term 
partner relationships and integrating other functional groups within the company in the 
purchasing decision (Anderson et al., 2009; Axelsson et al., 2005; Gadde et al, 2010). In this 
context, supplier assessment can become a systematic effort to promote the sharing of different 
perceptions and experiences generated through time within specific supplier-customer 
relationships.  
Our study added two important contributions to the literature. Firstly, the study reveals the 
potential for inconsistencies between the broader context of the prescribed business 
relationship with suppliers and the specific framework of criteria for evaluating them. Secondly, 
in the face of inconsistencies between the formal purchasing orientation and the specific 
frameworks used to work with and assess suppliers during line production, local solutions can 
emerge. These local solutions can translate into mutual adaptations, even after the start of 
production. As we have illustrated, operational level staff can actually suspend the formal 
transactional logic, at least temporally, and can act with a cooperative logic, in order to resolve 
non-conformances. 
Closer to a prescriptive stance, it is suggested that the suppliers’ informal disposition centres on 
technical challenges that should not be blocked by company rules, but instead should be 
considered for future sourcing decisions. Rather than view non-conformances as isolated 
events, they may be an opportunity to learn about their causes in close and remote routines and 
capabilities. In our focal organisation, this may mean that representatives from Purchasing and 
R&D need to be in close contact with emerging non-conformances on the shop floor.  
This study has some limitations, and it suggests some opportunities for future research. For 
instance, it has not been possible to evaluate to what extent the restrictions set by the customer 
regarding components’ specifications may have substantially reduced the suppliers ability to re-
use their experiences and competences with other customers. Likewise, it has not been possible 
to explore how different interfaces might have been activated that envisaged diverse purposes 
(see, e.g. Araujo et al, 1999), involving a pool of suppliers (Axelsson et al., 2005; Gadde et al., 
2010). This study also suggests that more research is required as to how the development 
process and changes in the specifications may occur along with their testing in user contexts, 
while new capabilities develop in-production contexts.  This may place additional demands on 
the mechanisms used to combine such a variety of experiences (Dyer and Hatch, 2006). 
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